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Abstract
Suppose a gambler starts with a fortune in (0, 1) and wishes to attain a fortune of 1 by
making a sequence of bets. Assume that whenever the gambler stakes the amount s, the
gambler’s fortune increases by s with probability w and decreases by s with probability 1−w,
where w < 1/2. Dubins and Savage showed that the optimal strategy, which they called
“bold play”, is always to bet min{f, 1 − f}, where f is the gambler’s current fortune. Here
we consider the problem in which the gambler may stake no more than ℓ at one time. We
show that the bold strategy of always betting min{ℓ, f, 1− f} is not optimal if ℓ is irrational,
extending a result of Heath, Pruitt, and Sudderth.
1 Introduction and background
Suppose a gambler starts with a fortune in (0, 1) and wishes to attain a fortune of 1 by making a
sequence of bets. If the gambler’s current fortune is f , then the gambler may stake any amount
less than or equal to f . The gambler wins the amount of the stake with probability w and loses
the stake with probability 1 − w. Following [8], we refer to this game as red-and-black. Clearly
the gambler should never stake more than 1− f , which is enough to ensure that the gambler will
reach the goal if the bet is won. The strategy in which the gambler always stakes min{f, 1− f}
is called bold play.
In [8], Dubins and Savage developed a general theory for gambling problems. For red-and-
black, they showed that if 0 < w < 1/2, which means that the game is subfair, then bold play
is the optimal strategy, in the sense that it maximizes the probability that the gambler will
eventually reach the goal. Their proof is also given in chapter 7 of [2] and chapter 24 of [10].
See [1] for some computations comparing the probability that a gambler will reach the goal using
bold play to the probability that a gambler will reach the goal using other strategies.
This result has been extended in several ways. Dubins and Savage [8] also considered primitive
casinos, in which the gambler loses the stake s with probability 1−w and wins [(1− r)/r]s with
probability w, where 0 < r < 1. Note that r = 1/2 is red-and-black. They showed that bold
play is optimal when the game is subfair, which in this case means w < r. Chen [5] considered
red-and-black with inflation, in which the goal is not to reach 1 but to reach (1 + α)n after n
bets for some n. He showed that bold play is optimal when w ≤ 1/2. A different extension is to
incorporate a discount factor, so that the gambler receives a utility of βn, where 0 < β ≤ 1, from
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reaching 1 on the nth bet. Klugman [12] showed that bold play is optimal for subfair red-and-
black with a discount factor. However, for some subfair primitive casinos, there exist discount
factors for which bold play is not optimal (see [4] and [6]). See also [17] for a discussion of the
optimality of bold play in some two-person games.
Several authors have considered discrete versions of this problem in which the gambler’s initial
fortune and the amount of each bet must be integers and the gambler’s goal is to attain a fortune
of n. An extensive discussion of discrete gambling problems such as this can be found in [13].
Bold play remains optimal when w < 1/2. Ross [15] showed that the timid strategy of staking
exactly 1 each time is optimal in the superfair case when w > 1/2. See also [16] for an analysis
of the superfair case when the minimum bet is 2. Dubins [7] showed, however, that if the win
probability is less than 1/2 but is allowed to depend on the gambler’s fortune, then bold play
need not be optimal.
Another direction of work concerns gambling problems in which there is a limit to how much
the gambler may bet. The simplest problem of this type involves red-and-black in which the
gambler may bet no more than ℓ ∈ (0, 1/2) at one time. In this case, we define bold play as
the strategy in which the gambler whose current fortune is f always stakes min{ℓ, f, 1 − f}.
Wilkins [18] showed that if w < 1/2 and ℓ = 1/n for some positive integer n ≥ 3, then bold
play maximizes the chance that the gambler will reach the goal. Chen [3] showed that bold play
remains optimal when there is a discount factor in addition to a limit on the stake of 1/n. In [14],
the optimality of bold play in continuous-time gambling problems was established under rather
general restrictions on the gambler.
However, Heath, Pruitt, and Sudderth [11] obtained an important negative result for discrete-
time red-and-black. They showed that if the gambler can stake at most ℓ, and if 1/(n + 1) <
ℓ < 1/n for some n ≥ 3 or if ℓ is irrational and 1/3 < ℓ < 1/2, then there exists ǫ > 0 such
that if 0 < w < ǫ, then bold play is not optimal. To see heuristically why this is true, suppose
1/4 < ℓ < 1/3 and the gambler’s initial fortune is f = 1/2 − δ, where δ is small. If the gambler
plays boldly and loses the first bet, then the gambler’s fortune after one bet will be 1/2− ℓ− δ.
The gambler’s fortune can at most double to 1− 2ℓ− 2δ after the second bet and therefore can
be at most 1−2δ after two more wins. However, if the gambler first stakes ℓ− δ and plays boldly
thereafter, then even with an initial loss, the gambler can reach the goal by winning the next
three bets. Consequently, for sufficiently small δ, first betting ℓ − δ makes the gambler more
likely to achieve the goal after winning three or fewer bets. As w ↓ 0, the probability that the
gambler can win four bets before going bankrupt gets very small relative to the probability that
the gambler wins three bets. Therefore, first betting ℓ− δ is a better strategy than bold play for
sufficiently small w.
The purpose of the present paper is to extend this result by showing that when ℓ is irrational,
bold play fails to be optimal for all w < 1/2, not just for very small w. The case of rational ℓ
remains open except when ℓ = 1/n for some n ≥ 3. Note that when ℓ is rational and 1/3 < ℓ <
1/2, it is not even known whether one can improve on bold play for very small w.
To state our result more precisely, define the function s : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] by s(f) = min{ℓ, f, 1−
f}. We think of s(f) as the bold stake for a gambler whose fortune is f . Denote by Xk the
gambler’s fortune after k bets, when the gambler plays boldly. Note that (Xk)
∞
k=0 is a Markov
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chain whose transition probabilities are given by
P (Xk+1 = f + s(f)|Xk = f) = w, (1.1)
P (Xk+1 = f − s(f)|Xk = f) = 1− w. (1.2)
Define Q(f) = P (Xk = 1 for some k|X0 = f), which is the probability that a gambler who starts
with a fortune of f will eventually reach the goal. The following is our main result.
Theorem 1.1. Suppose w < 1/2 and ℓ is irrational. Then, there exist f ∈ (0, 1) and ǫ ∈ (0, s(f))
such that
wQ(f + s(f)− ǫ) + (1− w)Q(f − s(f) + ǫ) > Q(f). (1.3)
If a gambler begins with a fortune of f and stakes s(f)−ǫ, then the gambler’s fortune after one
bet will be f + s(f)− ǫ with probability w and f − s(f)+ ǫ with probability 1−w. Consequently,
the left-hand side of (1.3) is the probability that the gambler will eventually reach the goal using
the strategy of first staking s(f) − ǫ and playing boldly thereafter, while the right-hand side of
(1.3) is the probability that the gambler will reach the goal using bold play. Therefore, (1.3)
implies that the strategy of first staking s(f)− ǫ and then playing boldly is superior to bold play,
and hence bold play is not optimal.
2 Proof of Theorem 1.1
In this section, we prove Theorem 1.1. The key to the proof will be the following proposition.
Here, and throughout the rest of the paper, all logarithms are assumed to be base 2. That is, we
write log n instead of log2 n.
Proposition 2.1. Let S = {f : P (Xk = 1− ℓ for some k|X0 = f) > 0}. That is, S is the set of
all f such that a gambler who starts with a fortune of f and plays boldly could have a fortune of
exactly 1− ℓ after a finite number of bets.
1. Suppose f ∈ S. Then there exists a constant C > 0 such that if 0 < ǫ < ℓ, then Q(f) −
Q(f − ǫ) ≥ C(1− w)− log ǫ.
2. Suppose f /∈ S. For all C > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that if 0 < ǫ < δ, then Q(f)−Q(f −
ǫ) ≤ C(1− w)− log ǫ.
3. If ℓ is irrational, then there exists f ∈ (ℓ, 1− ℓ) such that f − ℓ ∈ S and f + ℓ /∈ S.
Proposition 2.1 implies that Q(f)−Q(f − ǫ) is larger when f ∈ S than when f /∈ S. In other
words, the difference between a fortune of f and a fortune of f − ǫ matters more to the gambler
when f ∈ S than when f /∈ S. Part 3 of the proposition states that when ℓ is irrational, we can
find f such that f − s(f) ∈ S and f + s(f) /∈ S. We will show that if a gambler starts with a
fortune slightly below f , then it is better to make slightly less than the bold stake so that the
fortune will not fall below f − s(f) if the bet is lost. This will imply Theorem 1.1.
An important tool for the proof of Proposition 2.1 is a coupling construction in which we
follow two gamblers simultaneously. We present this construction in subsection 2.1. We prove
parts 1, 2, and 3 of Proposition 2.1 in subsections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 respectively. Then in subsection
2.5, we show how Theorem 1.1 follows from Proposition 2.1.
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2.1 A coupling construction
Throughout this and the next two subsections, we consider two Markov chains (Xk)
∞
k=0 and
(Yk)
∞
k=0. We define X0 = f1 and Y0 = f2, where f1 ≥ f2. Both chains evolve with the transition
probabilities given by (1.1) and (1.2). Consequently, we can think of Xk as the fortune after k
bets of a gambler whose initial fortune is f1, while Yk is the fortune after k bets of a gambler
whose initial fortune is f2.
We assume these sequences are coupled, so that both gamblers win and lose the same bets.
To construct this coupling, we work with the probability space (Ω,F , P ) defined as follows. Let
Ω = {0, 1}∞, and denote sequences in Ω by ω = (ω1, ω2, . . .), so ω → ωi is the ith coordinate
function. Let F0 be the trivial σ-field, and for positive integers k, let Fk be the σ-field generated
by the first k coordinate functions. Let F = σ(F1,F2, . . .) be the product σ-field. Let P be the
product probability measure with the property that P (ωi = 1) = w and P (ωi = 0) = 1 − w for
all i. We then say that the two gamblers win the ith bet if ωi = 1 and lose the ith bet if ωi = 0.
In particular, for k ≥ 0, we define Xk+1(ω) = Xk(ω)+ s(Xk(ω)) and Yk+1(ω) = Yk(ω)+ s(Yk(ω))
if ωk+1 = 1, and we define Xk+1(ω) = Xk(ω) − s(Xk(ω)) and Yk+1(ω) = Yk(ω) − s(Yk(ω)) if
ωk+1 = 0.
We now make some remarks pertaining to this construction.
1. Since s(f) = min{ℓ, f, 1 − f}, we see that if f ≤ g, then |s(g) − s(f)| ≤ g − f . Therefore,
f + s(f) ≤ g + s(g) and f − s(f) ≤ g − s(g). It then follows by induction and the
construction of the sequences (Xk)
∞
k=0 and (Yk)
∞
k=0 that Xk ≥ Yk for all k. Likewise, the
fact that |s(g)− s(f)| ≤ g − f implies that Xk − Yk ≤ 2
k(f1 − f2) for all k.
2. The fact that Xk ≥ Yk for all k means that if Yk = 1 then Xk = 1. Since Q(f1) = P (Xk =
1 for some k) and Q(f2) = P (Yk = 1 for some k), it follows that Q(f1) ≥ Q(f2). That is,
the function f 7→ Q(f) is nondecreasing.
3. Note that
E[Xk+1|Fk] = w(Xk + s(Xk)) + (1− w)(Xk − s(Xk))
= Xk + (2w − 1)s(Xk) ≤ Xk,
where the last inequality holds because w < 1/2. Therefore, (Xk)
∞
k=0 is a supermartingale
with respect to (Fk)
∞
k=0. By the same argument, (Yk)
∞
k=0 is a supermartingale with respect
to (Fk)
∞
k=0. By the Martingale Convergence Theorem (see chapter 4 of [9]), there exist
random variables L1 and L2 such that Xk → L1 a.s. and Yk → L2 a.s. as k → ∞. If
0 < ǫ < ℓ, then s(f) > ǫ for f ∈ [ǫ, 1 − ǫ]. It follows that L1 and L2 must be {0, 1}-valued
random variables. Furthermore, it is easy to see that Xk = 1 for sufficiently large k on
{L1 = 1} and Yk = 1 for sufficiently large k on {L2 = 1}. Thus, Q(f1) = P (L1 = 1) and
Q(f2) = P (L2 = 1), from which it follows that Q(f1)−Q(f2) = P (L1 = 1 and L2 = 0).
2.2 Proof of part 1 of Proposition 2.1
We begin with the following Lemma, in which we compute the gambler’s probability of reaching
the goal starting from a sequence of fortunes approaching 1.
Lemma 2.2. For all n ≥ 0, we have Q(1− 2−nℓ) = 1− (1− w)n(1−Q(1− ℓ)).
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Proof. The statement is obvious when n = 0. Suppose the result holds for some n ≥ 0. Since
s(1− 2−(n+1)ℓ) = 2−(n+1)ℓ, a gambler whose fortune is 1− 2−(n+1)ℓ will, after the next bet, have
a fortune of 1 with probability w and a fortune of 1− 2−nℓ with probability 1−w. Thus, by the
Markov property,
Q(1− 2−(n+1)ℓ) = w + (1− w)Q(1− 2−nℓ)
= w + (1− w)(1− (1− w)n(1−Q(1− ℓ)))
= 1− (1−w)n+1(1−Q(1− ℓ)).
The lemma now follows by induction on n.
Proof of part 1 of Proposition 2.1. Let f1 = f and f2 = f − ǫ, where 0 < ǫ < ℓ. Since f ∈ S,
there exists a positive integer k such that if B denotes the event that Xk = 1− ℓ and Xk+1 = 1,
then P (B) > 0. Note that for 0 ≤ j < k, we have Xj+1−Yj+1 ≥ Xj−Yj unless either Xj > 1− ℓ
and Xj+1 = 1, or Yj < ℓ and Yj+1 = 0. Therefore, if B occurs, then Yk ≤ 1 − ℓ − ǫ and thus
Yk+1 ≤ 1− ǫ. Combining this observation with remarks 2 and 3 in subsection 2.1, we get
Q(f)−Q(f − ǫ) = P (L1 = 1 and L2 = 0) ≥ P (B)P (L2 = 0|B) ≥ P (B)(1−Q(1− ǫ)).
Choose a nonnegative integer n such that 2−(n+1)ℓ < ǫ ≤ 2−nℓ, which implies that n ≤ log ℓ−log ǫ.
By Lemma 2.2,
Q(1− ǫ) ≤ Q(1− 2−(n+1)ℓ) = 1− (1− w)n+1(1−Q(1− ℓ))
≤ 1− (1− w)1+log ℓ−log ǫ(1−Q(1− ℓ)).
Thus, Q(f)−Q(f − ǫ) ≥ C(1− w)− log ǫ, where C = P (B)(1− w)1+log ℓ(1−Q(1− ℓ)).
2.3 Proof of part 2 of Proposition 2.1
Our next step is to prove part 2 of Proposition 2.1, which gives an upper bound for Q(f)−Q(f−ǫ)
when f /∈ S. We will compare the sequences (Xk)
∞
k=0 and (Yk)
∞
k=0 when f1 = f and f2 = f − ǫ.
Although (Xk − Yk)
∞
k=0 is not a supermartingale, we will be able to construct a supermartingale
by considering the differences between the gamblers’ fortunes at a sequence of stopping times.
It will then follow that the gamblers’ fortunes stay close enough together for us to obtain the
desired upper bound on Q(f)−Q(f − ǫ) when f /∈ S.
Given f and f∗ such that 0 ≤ f∗ ≤ f ≤ 1, define
h(f, f∗) =
{
1 if f = f∗
(s(f)− s(f∗))/(f − f∗) otherwise.
Note that −1 ≤ h(f, f∗) ≤ 1 for all f and f∗. If ℓ ≤ f∗ ≤ f ≤ 1 − ℓ, then s(f) = s(f∗) = ℓ,
which means h(f, f∗) = 0. If f∗ ≥ ℓ and f ≥ 1 − ℓ, then h(f, f∗) ≤ 0. If f∗ ≤ ℓ and f ≤ 1 − ℓ,
then h(f, f∗) ≥ 0. Also, recall that ωk = 1 if the gamblers win the kth bet, and ωk = 0 if the
gamblers lose the kth bet. We have
Xk+1(ω)− Yk+1(ω) =
{
(1 + h(Xk(ω), Yk(ω)))(Xk(ω)− Yk(ω)) if ωk+1 = 1
(1− h(Xk(ω), Yk(ω)))(Xk(ω)− Yk(ω)) if ωk+1 = 0.
(2.1)
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Define
Wk = (1−w)
− log(Xk−Yk) = (Xk − Yk)
− log(1−w). (2.2)
By (2.1), we have
E[Wk+1|Fk] = w(1 + h(Xk, Yk))
− log(1−w)Wk + (1− w)(1 − h(Xk, Yk))
− log(1−w)Wk
= g(h(Xk , Yk))Wk, (2.3)
where
g(x) = w(1 + x)− log(1−w) + (1− w)(1 − x)− log(1−w)
for −1 ≤ x ≤ 1. Note that
g′(x) = (− log(1− w))
(
w(1 + x)− log(1−w)−1 − (1− w)(1− x)− log(1−w)−1
)
.
Suppose 0 < x < 1. Since 0 < − log(1 − w) < 1, we have (1 + x)− log(1−w)−1 < 1 and (1 −
x)− log(1−w)−1 > 1. Therefore,
g′(x) ≤ (− log(1− w))(w − (1− w)) < 0.
Since g(0) = 1, it follows that 0 < g(x) < 1 for x ∈ (0, 1].
We now introduce four lemmas that will help us to define a supermartingale.
Lemma 2.3. Suppose 1− ℓ ≤ f2 ≤ f1 ≤ 1. Then E[W1] =W0.
Proof. We have s(f1) = 1 − f1 and s(f2) = 1 − f2. Therefore, h(f1, f2) = −1. Since g(−1) = 1,
it follows from (2.3) that E[W1] =W0.
Lemma 2.4. Suppose f2 ≤ f1 < 1 − ℓ. Define a stopping time R as follows. If h(f1, f2) ≥ 1/2,
define R = 0. If h(f1, f2) < 1/2, then let R(ω) = inf{j : ωj = 1 or h(Xj(ω), Yj(ω)) ≥ 1/2}. Let
L = ⌊1 + (1− 2ℓ)/ℓ⌋. Then R ≤ L and E[WR] ≤W0.
Proof. Proceeding by contradiction, suppose R(ω) > L for some ω. Then the gamblers must lose
the first L bets. However, by the definition of L, any gambler who starts with a fortune of at
most 1− ℓ and then loses L consecutive bets has a fortune of at most ℓ. Therefore, there exists
j ≤ L such that 0 < Xj ≤ ℓ. Since Xj ≥ Yj, it follows that Yj ≤ ℓ, and thus s(Xj) = Xj and
s(Yj) = Yj . However, this means that h(Xj , Yj) = 1, and thus R ≤ j, a contradiction. Hence,
R ≤ L.
For j < R, we have Yj ≤ Xj < 1 − ℓ, and therefore 0 ≤ h(Xj , Yj) ≤ 1. Since g(x) ≤ 1 for
x ∈ [0, 1], we have, with the aid of (2.3),
E[W(j+1)∧R|Fj ] =Wj∧R1{R≤j} + E[Wj+1|Fj ]1{R>j}
=Wj∧R1{R≤j} + g(h(Xj , Yj))Wj1{R>j} ≤Wj∧R.
Therefore, (Wj∧R)
∞
j=0 is a supermartingale with respect to (Fj)
∞
j=0. Note that 0 ≤Wj∧R ≤ 1 for
all j, so the Optional Stopping Theorem (see chapter 4 of [9]) gives E[WR] ≤W0.
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Lemma 2.5. Suppose f2 ≤ f1 < 1− ℓ. Let
T (ω) = inf{j ≥ 1 : ωj = 1 or h(Xj−1(ω), Yj−1(ω)) ≥ 1/2}.
Let L = ⌊1 + (1− 2ℓ)/ℓ⌋ as in Lemma 2.4. Then T ≤ L+ 1 and E[WT ] ≤ αW0, where
α = 1− (1− g(1/2))(1 − w)2L.
Proof. Define the stopping time R as in Lemma 2.4. Then T = R if and only if the gamblers win
the Rth bet; otherwise, T = R + 1. Clearly T ≤ L + 1 by Lemma 2.4. Let A be the event that
the gamblers win the Rth bet. Then
E[WT ] = E[E[WT |FR]] = E[WR1A + E[WR+1|FR]1Ac ].
By the strong Markov property and (2.3), E[WR+1|FR] = g(h(XR, YR))WR. If the gamblers lose
the Rth bet, then h(XR, YR) ≥ 1/2. Therefore, since g is decreasing on [0, 1],
E[WR+1|FR]1Ac ≤ g(1/2)WR1Ac .
Thus,
E[WT ] ≤ E[WR1A + g(1/2)WR1Ac ] = E[WR − (1− g(1/2))WR1Ac ]. (2.4)
If Ac occurs, then the gamblers lose the first R bets, and h(Xj , Yj) < 1/2 for all j < R. If
h(Xj , Yj) < 1/2 and the gamblers lose the (j + 1)st bet, then Xj+1 − Yj+1 ≥ (Xj − Yj)/2. Thus,
on Ac we have XR − YR ≥ 2
−R(f1 − f2) ≥ 2
−L(f1 − f2). Thus,
E[WR1Ac ] ≥ E[(2
−L(f1 − f2))
− log(1−w)1Ac ]
= 2L log(1−w)W0P (A
c) = P (Ac)(1− w)LW0. (2.5)
Since Ac occurs whenever the gamblers lose the first L bets, we have P (Ac) ≥ (1 − w)L. Thus,
since E[WR] ≤W0 by Lemma 2.4, combining (2.4) and (2.5) gives
E[WT ] ≤ E[WR]− (1− g(1/2))(1 − w)
2LW0 ≤ (1− (1− g(1/2))(1 − w)
2L)W0 = αW0,
which completes the proof.
Lemma 2.6. Suppose f2 < 1− ℓ and 1− ℓ ≤ f1 < 1− ℓ/2. Define the stopping time T by
T (ω) =
{
1 if ω1 = 1
inf{j ≥ 2 : ωj = 1 or h(Xj−1(ω), Yj−1(ω)) ≥ 1/2} otherwise.
Let N(ω) = 1− α if ω1 = 1, and let N(ω) = 1 if ω1 = 0. Then T ≤ L+ 2 and E[NWT ] ≤W0.
Proof. Let A be the event that that the gamblers win the first bet, which means ω1 = 1. We
have
E[NWT ] = E[E[NWT |F1]] = E[(1 − α)W11A + E[WT |F1]1Ac ].
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If the gamblers lose the first bet, then X1 = f1 − s(f1) = 2f1 − 1 < 1− ℓ. Therefore, Lemma 2.5
and the Markov property give T ≤ L+ 2 and E[WT |F1]1Ac ≤ αW11Ac . Thus,
E[NWT ] ≤ E[(1− α)W11A + αW11Ac ]
= w(1− α)[(1 + h(f1, f2))(f1 − f2)]
− log(1−w)
+ (1 −w)α[(1 − h(f1, f2))(f1 − f2)]
− log(1−w)
=
[
w(1 − α)(1 + h(f1, f2))
− log(1−w) + (1− w)α(1 − h(f1, f2))
− log(1−w)
]
W0
≤
[
w(1 − α)2− log(1−w) + (1− w)α2− log(1−w)
]
W0
=
(
w
1− w
(1− α) + α
)
W0 ≤W0,
which completes the proof.
By combining Lemmas 2.3, 2.5, and 2.6, we can obtain Proposition 2.7, in which we construct
the supermartingale needed to prove part 2 of Proposition 2.1. We first inductively define a
sequence of stopping times (Tk)
∞
k=0. Let T0 = 0. Given Tk, we define Tk+1 according to the
following rules:
1. If YTk(ω) ≥ 1− ℓ, then let Tk+1(ω) = Tk(ω) + 1.
2. If XTk(ω) < 1− ℓ, let
Tk+1(ω) = inf{j ≥ Tk(ω) + 1 : ωj = 1 or h(Xj−1(ω), Yj−1(ω)) ≥ 1/2}.
3. Suppose YTk(ω) < 1 − ℓ and 1 − ℓ ≤ XTk(ω) < 1 − ℓ/2. If ωTk(ω)+1 = 1, meaning the
gamblers win the (Tk + 1)st bet, then let Tk+1(ω) = Tk(ω) + 1. Otherwise, let Tk+1(ω) =
inf{j ≥ Tk(ω) + 2 : ωj = 1 or h(Xj−1(ω), Yj−1(ω)) ≥ 1/2}.
4. If YTk < 1− ℓ and XTk ≥ 1− ℓ/2, then let Tk+1 = Tk.
Proposition 2.7. Define the sequence of stopping times (Tk)
∞
k=0 as above. For k ≥ 0, let
Bk = #{j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} : XTj < 1 − ℓ}, where #S denotes the cardinality of the set S.
Let Nk = 1 − α on the event that, for some j ≤ Tk, we have Yj−1 < 1 − ℓ ≤ Xj−1 and the
gamblers win the jth bet. Otherwise, let Nk = 1. Define Zk = α
−BkNkWTk . Then (Zk)
∞
k=0 is a
supermartingale with respect to the filtration (FTk)
∞
k=0. Furthermore, Tk+1 ≤ Tk + L + 2 for all
k ≥ 0.
Proof. Let A1,k be the event that YTk ≥ 1 − ℓ, and let A2,k be the event that XTk < 1 − ℓ. Let
A3,k be the event that YTk < 1 − ℓ and 1 − ℓ ≤ XTk < 1 − ℓ/2. Let A4,k be the event that
YTk < 1− ℓ and XTk ≥ 1− ℓ/2. Note that for all k, exactly one of these four events occurs. We
consider the four cases separately.
First, suppose A1,k occurs. Then XTk ≥ 1− ℓ, so Bk+1 = Bk. Also, note that Tk+1 = Tk + 1
and YTk ≥ 1− ℓ, so Nk+1 = Nk. Therefore, by Lemma 2.3 and the strong Markov property,
E[Zk+11A1,k |FTk ] = α
−BkNkE[WTk+1 |FTk ]1A1,k
= α−BkNkE[WTk+1|FTk ]1A1,k
= α−BkNkWTk1A1,k = Zk1A1,k . (2.6)
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Next, suppose A2,k occurs. Then XTk < 1 − ℓ, so Bk+1 = Bk + 1. The gamblers lose bets
Tk + 1, . . . , Tk+1 − 1, so Xj < 1 − ℓ for Tk ≤ j ≤ Tk+1 − 1. Therefore, Nk+1 = Nk. By Lemma
2.5 and the strong Markov property,
E[Zk+11A2,k |FTk ] = α
−(Bk+1)NkE[WTk+1 |FTk ]1A2,k
≤ α−(Bk+1)Nk(αWTk)1A2,k = α
−BkNkWTk1A2,k = Zk1A2,k . (2.7)
Suppose A3,k occurs. Then XTk ≥ 1 − ℓ, so Bk+1 = Bk. Since XTk < 1, we have Nk = 1. If
the gamblers win the (Tk + 1)st bet, then Nk+1 = 1 − α. Otherwise, XTk+1 = XTk − s(XTk) =
2XTk − 1 < 1 − ℓ and the gamblers lose bets Tk + 2, . . . , Tk+1 − 1, so Nk+1 = 1. By Lemma 2.6
and the strong Markov property,
E[Zk+11A3,k |FTk ] = α
−BkE[Nk+1WTk+1 |FTk ]1A3,k ≤ α
−BkWTk1A3,k = Zk1A3,k . (2.8)
Finally, if A4,k occurs, then Tk+1 = Tk. Therefore, Nk+1 = Nk and WTk+1 = WTk . Since
XTk > 1 − ℓ, we also have Bk+1 = Bk and thus Zk+1 = Zk. Therefore, E[Zk+11A4,k |FTk ] =
Zk1A4,k . This fact, combined with equations (2.6), (2.7), and (2.8), gives E[Zk+1|FTk ] ≤ Zk.
Hence, (Zk)
∞
k=0 is a supermartingale with respect to the filtration (FTk)
∞
k=0.
To complete the proof, note that clearly Tk+1 ≤ Tk +L+2 if A1,k or A4,k occurs. The strong
Markov property combined with Lemmas 2.5 and 2.6 implies that Tk+1 ≤ Tk + L + 2 if A2,k or
A3,k occurs.
We now use Proposition 2.7 to establish an upper bound on Q(f) − Q(f − ǫ) when f /∈ S.
We will need one more lemma.
Lemma 2.8. Fix f /∈ S, and let N be a positive integer. Then there exists a positive integer
M and a positive real number δ such that if f1 = f and f2 = f − ǫ where 0 < ǫ < δ, then the
following hold:
1. If Xk ≥ 1− ℓ and Yk < 1− ℓ, then k > M(L+ 2), where L = ⌊1 + (1− 2ℓ)/ℓ⌋.
2. Let Dk = #{j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} : XTj < 1− ℓ or XTj = 1}. Then DM ≥ N .
Proof. Let R′k be the set of all possible values of Xk, and let Rk =
⋃k
j=0R
′
j. Note that Rk is
a finite set because there are only 2k possible outcomes for the first k bets. For all g ∈ [0, 1),
let v(g) be the number of consecutive bets that a gambler whose fortune is g must lose for the
fortune to drop below 1 − ℓ. That is, v(g) = 0 when 0 ≤ g < 1 − ℓ and, for positive integers
k, v(g) = k when 1 − 2−k+1ℓ ≤ g < 1 − 2−kℓ. Let Vk = max{v(g) : g ∈ Rk}. Let M0 = 0.
For i ≥ 0, let Mi+1 = Mi + VMi(L+2) + 1. Let M = MN . Choose θ > 0 small enough that
RM(L+2) ∩ (1 − ℓ, 1 − ℓ + θ) = ∅. Let δ = 2
−M(L+2)θ. We will show that the two conditions of
the lemma are satisfied for these choices of M and δ.
Suppose k ≤M(L+2). IfXk ≥ 1−ℓ, thenXk ≥ 1−ℓ+θ, since f /∈ S and R
′
k∩(1−ℓ, 1−ℓ+θ) =
∅. By the first remark in subsection 2.1, we have Xk − Yk ≤ 2
kǫ < 2M(L+2)δ = θ. Therefore,
Yk ≥ 1− ℓ. This proves the first part of the lemma.
To prove the second part, we claim that for i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, we have
DMi+VMi(L+2)+1 ≥ DMi + 1. (2.9)
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To see how (2.9) implies the second part of the lemma, first note that DM0 = D0 = 0. Suppose
DMi ≥ i for some i ≥ 0. Then DMi+1 = DMi+VMi(L+2)+1 ≥ DMi + 1 ≥ i + 1 by (2.9). Hence, by
induction, (2.9) implies that DM ≥ N . Thus, we need only to prove (2.9). First, suppose either
XTMi < 1 − ℓ or XTMi = 1. Then DMi+1 = DMi + 1. Since (Di)
∞
i=0 is a nonincreasing sequence
and VMi(L+2) ≥ 0, we have (2.9).
Thus, it remains only to prove (2.9) when 1− ℓ ≤ XTMi < 1. Write v for v(XTMi ). Note that
v ≤ VTMi , and TMi ≤Mi(L+ 2) by Proposition 2.7. Therefore
TMi + v ≤ TMi + VTMi ≤Mi(L+ 2) + VMi(L+2)
≤ (Mi + VMi(L+2))(L+ 2) ≤M(L+ 2). (2.10)
We now consider two cases. First, suppose the gamblers lose the bets TMi +1, . . . , TMi + v. Then
Xj ≥ 1 − ℓ for TMi ≤ j ≤ TMi+v−1 and XTMi+v < 1 − ℓ. Also, by (2.10) and the first part
of the lemma, we have Yj ≥ 1 − ℓ for TMi ≤ j ≤ TMi+v−1. Therefore, by the definition of the
sequence (Tj)
∞
j=0, we have TMi+k = TMi + k for 1 ≤ k ≤ v. It follows that XTMi+v < 1 − ℓ,
which means DMi+v+1 = DMi + 1. Thus, DMi+VMi(L+2)+1 ≥ DMi+v+1 = DMi + 1, which is
(2.9). Finally, we consider the case in which, for some j ∈ {1, . . . , v}, the gamblers lose the
bets TMi + 1, . . . , TMi + j − 1 but win the bet TMi + j. Then, XTMi+j = XTMi+j = 1 and
DMi+j+1 = DMi + 1. Hence, DMi+VMi(L+2)+1 ≥ DMi + 1, which is (2.9).
Proof of part 2 of Proposition 2.1. Fix C > 0, and fix f /∈ S. Since 0 < α < 1, there exists a
positive integer N such that
α−N (1− α)(1 − w)− log(ℓ/2) ≥ C−1.
Define M and δ as in Lemma 2.8. Fix ǫ ∈ (0, δ). Define (Tk)
∞
k=0 and (Zk)
∞
k=0 as in Proposition
2.7, with f1 = f and f2 = f − ǫ.
By Remark 3 in subsection 2.1, there exist random variables L1 and L2 such that Xk → L1
a.s. and Yk → L2 a.s. as k → ∞, and Q(f)−Q(f − ǫ) = P (L1 = 1 and L2 = 0). Let A be the
event that L1 = 1 and L2 = 0. Then there is an integer-valued random variable K such that, on
the event A, we have XTK ≥ 1 − ℓ/2 and YTK < 1 − ℓ. By part 1 of Lemma 2.8, on the event
A, we have TK > M(L + 2) and thus K ≥ M . It also follows from part 1 of Lemma 2.8 that if
XTj = 1 for j ≤ M , then YTj = 1, and therefore L2 = 1. Consequently, on the event A, we can
see from the definitions of (Bi)
∞
i=0 and (Di)
∞
i=0 that BM = DM and thus, using part 2 of Lemma
2.8, BK ≥ BM = DM ≥ N .
Since (Zk)
∞
k=0 is a nonnegative supermartingale, it follows from the Martingale Convergence
Theorem (see Corollary 2.11 in chapter 4 of [9]) that there exists a random variable Z such that
Zk → Z a.s. and E[Z] ≤ E[Z0]. On the event A, if j > K then Tj = TK and thus Zj = ZK = Z.
Hence, using (2.2),
Z1A = ZK1A = α
−BKNK(1− w)
− log(XTK−YTK )1A
≥ α−N (1− α)(1 − w)− log(l/2)1A ≥ C
−11A.
It follows that E[Z] ≥ C−1P (A). Thus, Q(f) − Q(f − ǫ) = P (A) ≤ CE[Z] ≤ CE[Z0] =
C(1− w)− log ǫ, as claimed.
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2.4 Proof of part 3 of Proposition 2.1
Let D1 = S ∩ [0, l] and D2 = S ∩ [1− ℓ, 1]. Define a sequence of stopping times (τk)
∞
k=0 by τ0 = 0
and τk+1 = inf{n > τk : Xn ∈ [0, ℓ] ∪ [1− ℓ, 1]} for all k ≥ 0. Then define
Dk = {f : P (Xτj = 1− l for some j ≤ k|X0 = f) > 0}.
Let D1k = Dk ∩ [0, ℓ] and D
2
k = Dk ∩ [1− ℓ, ℓ]. Note that D
1 =
⋃∞
k=0D
1
k and D
2 =
⋃∞
k=0D
2
k. We
have D10 = ∅ and D
2
0 = {1− ℓ}. For k ≥ 1,
D1k = {f ∈ [0, ℓ] : P (Xτ1 ∈ Dk−1|X0 = f) > 0} ∪D
1
k−1
D2k = {f ∈ [1− ℓ, 1] : P (Xτ1 ∈ Dk−1|X0 = f) > 0} ∪D
2
k−1.
Suppose X0 = f . If f ∈ (ℓ, 1 − ℓ), then s(f) = ℓ for all k < τ1. Therefore Xτ1 = f + nℓ for
some n ∈ Z. If instead f ∈ [0, ℓ], then s(f) = f , in which case either X1 = Xτ1 = 0 or X1 = 2f .
If X1 = 2f , then Xτ1 = 2f + nℓ for some n ∈ Z, where n = 0 if 2f ∈ [0, l] ∪ [1 − ℓ, 1]. Likewise,
suppose f ∈ [1− ℓ, ℓ]. Then s(f) = 1−f , so either X1 = Xτ1 = 1 or X1 = 2f −1. If X1 = 2f −1,
then Xτ1(f) = 2f − 1 + nℓ for some n ∈ Z, where n = 0 if 2f − 1 ∈ [0, ℓ] ∪ [1− ℓ, 1].
We claim that if f ∈ D1 ∪D2, then there exist integers a, b, and c such that f = 2−c(a+ bℓ).
Furthermore, we claim that if f 6= 1 − ℓ, then we can choose a, b, and c such that c ≥ 1, a ≥ 1,
a or b is odd, and a ≥ 2 if f ∈ D2. We will prove these claims by induction on k. Note that
D0 = {1 − ℓ}, so for f ∈ D0 we can take a = 1, b = −1, and c = 0. Now, suppose our claims
hold when f ∈ Dk−1, where k ≥ 1. To show that our claims hold when f ∈ Dk, we consider two
cases.
First, suppose f ∈ D1k \ Dk−1. Then P (Xτ1 = g|X0 = f) > 0 for some g ∈ Dk−1. Since
0 /∈ S, we must have 2f + nℓ = g, or equivalently f = (g − nℓ)/2, for some n ∈ Z and g ∈ Dk−1.
If g = 1 − ℓ, then f = (1 − (n + 1)ℓ)/2, so f = 2−c(a + bℓ), where a = 1, b = −(n + 1), and
c = 1. If g 6= 1 − ℓ, then g = 2−c(a + bℓ), where c ≥ 1, a ≥ 1, and a or b is odd. Then
f = 2−(c+1)(a+ bℓ− 2cnℓ) = 2−(c+1)(a+ (b− 2cn)ℓ). Note that c+ 1 ≥ 1, a ≥ 1, and b− 2cn is
odd if b is odd, so a or b− 2cn is odd.
Next, suppose f ∈ D2k \Dk−1. Then P (Xτ1 = g|X0 = f) > 0 for some g ∈ Dk−1. Since 1 /∈ S,
we have 2f − 1 + nℓ = g, or equivalently f = (1 + g − nℓ)/2, for some n ∈ Z and g ∈ Dk−1. If
g = 1 − ℓ, then f = (2 − (n + 1)ℓ)/2. If n + 1 were even, then f = 1 − mℓ for some positive
integer m; since D2 ⊆ [1 − ℓ, 1], we would have f ∈ {1 − ℓ, 1}, which is a contradiction because
1 /∈ D2k and 1− ℓ ∈ Dk−1. Therefore, n+ 1 is odd, so f = 2
−c(a+ bℓ), where c = 1, a = 2, and b
is odd. If instead g 6= 1 − ℓ, then g = 2−c(a + bℓ), where c ≥ 1, a ≥ 1, and a or b is odd. Then
f = 2−(c+1)(2c + a+ bℓ− 2cnℓ) = 2−(c+1)[(2c + a) + (b− 2cn)ℓ]. Note that c+ 1 ≥ 1, 2c + a ≥ 2,
and either 2c + a or b− 2cn is odd because 2c and 2cn are even and either a or b is odd. It now
follows by induction that our claims hold for all f ∈ D1 ∪D2.
Since ℓ < 1/2, we can choose a positive integer m such that 1 −mℓ ∈ (ℓ, 2ℓ]. We can then
choose positive integers d and n such that 2−d(1−mℓ) < 1−2ℓ and 2−d(1−ℓ)+nℓ ∈ (1−2ℓ, 1−ℓ).
Let f = 2−d(1−mℓ)+nℓ. Note that f ∈ (ℓ, 1− ℓ). Also, f − ℓ = 2−d(1−mℓ)+(n−1)ℓ. Suppose
a gambler who starts with a fortune of f−ℓ loses the first n−1 bets, then wins the next d+m−1.
After the n− 1 losses, the gambler’s fortune will be 2−d(1−mℓ). Then after d wins, the fortune
will be 1−mℓ. After m− 1 additional wins, the gambler’s fortune will be 1− ℓ. Consequently,
P (Xn+m+d−2 = 1− ℓ|X0 = f − ℓ) > 0,
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which means f − ℓ ∈ S. We now show by contradiction that f + ℓ /∈ S, which will complete the
proof. Suppose f + ℓ ∈ S. Since f + ℓ > 1 − ℓ, there exist integers a, b, and c such that a ≥ 2,
c ≥ 1, a or b is odd, and f + ℓ = 2−c(a + bℓ). We also have f + ℓ = 2−d(1 + (2d(n + 1) −m)ℓ).
Therefore, 2d(a + bℓ) = 2c[1 + (2d(n + 1) −m)ℓ], and so 2da − 2c = [2c(2d(n + 1) −m) − 2db]ℓ.
Since ℓ is irrational, we must have 2da− 2c = 2c(2d(n+ 1) −m)− 2db = 0. Thus, 2da = 2c, and
since a ≥ 2, it follows that a is even and c > d. Therefore, b is odd and b = 2c−d(2d(n+1)−m),
which is a contradiction.
2.5 Obtaining Theorem 1.1 from Proposition 2.1
Suppose ℓ is irrational. By part 3 of Proposition 2.1, there exists f0 ∈ (ℓ, 1−ℓ) such that f0−ℓ ∈ S
and f0 + ℓ /∈ S. Let f = f0 − ǫ, where 0 < ǫ < ℓ and ǫ is small enough that f ∈ (ℓ, 1 − ℓ). We
will show that for sufficiently small ǫ, we have
wQ(f + ℓ− ǫ) + (1− w)Q(f − ℓ+ ǫ) > Q(f), (2.11)
which implies Theorem 1.1 because s(f) = ℓ. Note that
wQ(f + ℓ− ǫ) + (1− w)Q(f − ℓ+ ǫ) = wQ(f0 + ℓ− 2ǫ) + (1− w)Q(f0 − ℓ). (2.12)
Since f 7→ Q(f) is nondecreasing, we have
Q(f) = wQ(f + ℓ) + (1− w)Q(f − ℓ) ≤ wQ(f0 + ℓ) + (1− w)Q(f0 − ℓ− ǫ). (2.13)
Since f0− ℓ ∈ S, it follows from part 1 of Proposition 2.1 that there exists a constant C > 0 such
that
Q(f0 − ℓ)−Q(f0 − ℓ− ǫ) ≥ C(1− w)
− log ǫ. (2.14)
Let C0 = C(1−w). Since f0 + ℓ /∈ S, part 2 of Proposition 2.1 implies that for sufficiently small
ǫ, we have
Q(f0 + ℓ)−Q(f0 + ℓ− 2ǫ) ≤ C0(1− w)
− log 2ǫ = C(1− w)− log ǫ. (2.15)
Let B = C(1− w)− log ǫ. Equations (2.12)-(2.15) imply
wQ(f + ℓ− ǫ) + (1− w)Q(f − ℓ+ ǫ)−Q(f) ≥ −wB + (1− w)B = (1− 2w)B > 0
for sufficiently small ǫ, which gives (2.11).
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